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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4359 
___________ 
 
DENNIS BARNA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LIEUTENANT BOYCE; CAPTAIN SNYDER; CAPTAIN D.P. PASERBA;  
MAJOR MELISSA HAINSWORTH; MAJOR BARRY GRUB;  
SUPERINTENDENT SOMERSET SCI; DEPUTY DANIEL GEHKMANN; 
HEARING EXAMINER JOSEPH DUPONT; CHIEF HEARING EXAMINER ROBIN 
LEWIS; PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT DENISE SWINEHART;  
UNKNOWN JAILHOUSE INFORMANT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00140) 
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 3, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 15, 2014) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Dennis Barna, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s order dismissing without 
leave to amend his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint.  We will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment because this appeal does not present a substantial question.  
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Barna filed a § 1983 complaint alleging that staff at State Correctional Institution 
– Somerset (SCI-Somerset) falsified a misconduct report that resulted in the rescission of 
his grant of parole.  Specifically, Barna was granted parole in March 2012.  While Barna 
was waiting for his parole to be executed, a confidential informant told SCI-Somerset 
officials that Barna was selling his prescription medication Neurontin to another inmate.  
In April 2012, SCI-Somerset officials confronted Barna and he denied selling medication.  
A misconduct report was filed against Barna charging him with drug possession with 
intent to deliver.  A second misconduct report was later filed, charging Barna with 
possession with intent to deliver, lying to an employee, and loaning or borrowing 
property. 
 A disciplinary hearing was held and the misconduct was sustained as to the charge 
of lying to an employee; the other charges were dismissed.  The Disciplinary Hearing 
Report noted that after staff received information from the confidential informant, Barna 
and the inmate who bought the Neurontin had their blood tested.  According to the report, 
the testing showed that Barna’s blood did not indicate the presence of Neurontin, while 
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the blood test of the other inmate, who was not prescribed Neurontin, did.  Barna was 
sentenced to 30 days in the Restricted Housing Unit.  In June 2012, The Pennsylvania 
Board of Probation and Parole rescinded Barna’s grant of parole due to his misconduct.  
Barna challenged the misconduct charge unsuccessfully through all levels of the prison 
grievance process. 
 Barna alleged in his complaint that the Disciplinary Hearing Officer relied on 
falsified evidence.  Specifically, Barna asserted that his blood test showed the presence of 
Neurontin and that a blood test was never performed on the other inmate.  Barna claimed 
that he was prevented from having a doctor explain the test results.  Thus, Barna claimed 
that the misconduct proceedings violated his due process rights.  
 In a report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the 
complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because there is no federal 
constitutional right protecting inmates from false misconduct charges.  The District Court 
issued a memorandum order, concluding that Barna was not entitled to due process 
protections during his misconduct proceedings, and, over Barna’s objections, adopted the 
report and recommendation and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.  Barna 
appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We accept all well-pleaded allegations as 
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true and draw all reasonable inferences in Barna’s favor.  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 
588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  We may summarily affirm if an appeal 
does not present a substantial question.  LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
III. 
 Section 1983 provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal 
law committed by state officials.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  To state a claim under § 1983, a 
plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right 
by a state actor.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).  “A protected liberty 
interest may arise from only one of two sources: the Due Process Clause or the laws of a 
state.”  Asquith v. Dep’t of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).  A prisoner facing 
the loss of a legally cognizable liberty interest following disciplinary proceedings has a 
due process right to certain procedural protections.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 
566-67 (1974).   
 Barna argues that the rescission of his grant of parole constitutes a legally 
cognizable liberty interest.  However, the Supreme Court has held that where state law 
provides parole authorities complete discretion to rescind a grant of parole prior to 
release, an inmate’s expectation of release on parole is not a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest.  See Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981).  Here, because Pennsylvania 
law provides that the Board may at any time rescind an order granting parole until parole 
is “executed” —i.e., an inmate is released—Barna had no liberty interest in the pre-
5 
 
execution grant.  See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 532 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1987).   
 Next, Barna argues that his placement in the Restricted Housing Unit for 30 days 
violated his due process rights.  However, due process protection is not triggered unless 
the prison “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  Barna 
did not present any evidence that his confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit, and the 
conditions he faced there, constituted an atypical and significant hardship, and we have 
held that this type of confinement does not confer a cognizable liberty interest.  See 
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that seven months in 
disciplinary confinement did not violate a protected liberty interest).  Consequently, his 
claim of a violation of his due process rights fails.  Finally, given that the complaint 
focused entirely on the misconduct proceeding, which did not violate Barna’s due process 
rights, leave to amend would have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that leave to amend should be granted unless 
amendment would be futile).  Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed the 
§ 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim without leave to amend.   
